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As the brief survey in chapter 2 indicated, a single nation at a time has typically 
dominated the world’s whaling activities, but there has been a series of dis- 
placements of  one leader by  another.’ In the seventeenth century the Dutch 
replaced the British. In the eighteenth century the British regained their former 
position, but were again replaced three-quarters of a century later-this  time 
by their former colonists, the Americans. Before the end of the nineteenth cen- 
tury the Americans were replaced by the Norwegians, and within five decades 
Norway’s position had been undercut by the Japanese and the Russians. Inter- 
national  rivalry has been characteristic of  the industry; one such conflict- 
between Great Britain and the United States-ushered  in the Golden Age of 
American whaling. The short period of intense British-American competition 
(1817-42)  provides  an ideal laboratory in which to examine the effects on 
productivity  and profits of  the  managerial choices  and national-policy  con- 
straints that marked the British and American experiences. 
Whaling’s natural resource, whales, was not the property of a single country, 
nor were the stocks available to one country of  better or worse quality than 
those available to any other. Except in time of war, the vessels of every mari- 
time nation enjoyed equal access to the supply of whales. Moreover, for at least 
a century before 1817, the same store of technical knowledge was open to all 
competitors. The ship Truelove, for example, one of the most successful British 
1. The argument in this chapter follows closely that in Davis, Gallman, and Hutchins  1987b. 
The current American data set, however, is much larger than the data set underlying the earlier 
paper; we have restricted the data set used in this chapter to voyages that brought back little or no 
sperm oil; a number of small errors have been corrected; and productivity has been calculated in 
a slightly different way. The most important change is the restriction of the data set to voyages that 
brought back chiefly baleen and whale oil. Also, the current profit estimates are of pure profits; 
the figures in the earlier paper were gross of  various costs, and the profit rates published therein 
are therefore higher than the rates here. In spite of these differences, the chief conclusions in this 
chapter remain the same as those in the paper. 
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whalers, was neither designed nor built in Great Britain.  She was commis- 
sioned in the colonies in 1764 and owned and sailed by colonists, from colonial 
ports, until she was captured by the Royal Navy during the Revolutionary War. 
In 1780 the ship was sold to private owners in the United Kingdom. Between 
then  and  1868 the  Truelove completed  seventy-two  whaling  voyages under 
British command (Jenkins 1921,194-95).  Many of the most successful British 
whaling entrepreneurs were American CmigrCs who left Nantucket at the be- 
ginning or the end of the Revolutionary War.* 
Similarly, sailors and whaling experts were drawn from a variety of  labor 
markets. The composition of the crew of the Pequod may reflect literary imper- 
atives, but it does not  distort the  whaling world  unduly. Melville  sailed in 
American and Australian whalers in the 184Os, and knew that their crews were 
recruited from many races and many nations. American law required that whal- 
ing officers be American citizens, and, if penalties were to be avoided, two- 
thirds of  the crew also had to be American, but there were ways around the 
These international elements  meant that to a large extent the differences 
between the British and American fleets reflected managerial and political de- 
cisions, not natural endowments or asymmetric information. First, although 
before 1825 or 1830 most US.  whaling crewmen were Americans, American 
agents had access to an international labor market. After 1830, as the industry 
expanded and exhausted the native labor markets, crew lists frequently contain 
names such as Joe or Sam Kanaka, and the lists of stations, or positions, are 
scattered with descriptions such as Green Portuguese, Malay, and Spanish Is- 
lands. The present population of  New Bedford, heavily weighted by descen- 
dants of nineteenth-century Portuguese and Cape Verde whalemen, attests to 
the international character of the whaling labor market. In Great Britain, where 
the government viewed the fishery as a training ground for the navy, both offi- 
cers and crew members were usually British. 
Second, both American and British entrepreneurs were required by law to 
acquire their vessels from domestic shipbuilders or  owner^.^ The Americans 
were fortunate to be buying from the cheaper source. 
Third, with the exceptions noted above, concerning the provenance of the 
ruies.3 
2. Jackson 1978, 93-94,  describes negotiations in  1785 between one of the Rotches, then still 
at Nantucket, and British authorities. The proposal was made that five hundred Nantucketers, with 
their vessels, move to Milford Haven, on the west coast, and create a new whaling community. To 
this plan the London expatriates-Enderby  and Champion-objected  strenuously, and in their 
objections they were supported by the Board of Customs. The Londoners would have been pleased 
to add Nantucketers to their crews, but found the idea of a competitive whaling community at 
Milford Haven unappealing. Rotch left in a huff for Dunkirk, but plans for a Dunkirk-Nantucket 
whaling center fell through. 
3. For example, the second rule did not hold if crewmen who were lost by desertion, illness, or 
death had to be replaced in a foreign labor market in which there were no American semen.  Also, 
stateless persons counted as Americans. See An Act  concerning the Navigation of  the United 
States, 1817, Sfafs.  at Large of  USA 3:351-52;  Hohman 1928,453-52. 
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vessel and the composition of the crew, the American effort was conducted in 
an economic environment largely free of government restrictions or subsidies. 
Heavy British subsidies were not without cost; major restrictions-direct  and 
indirect-were  placed on managerial decisions by the government. 
As a result of American and British restrictions, neither capital nor labor 
was completely mobile, and entrepreneurs in the two countries faced different 
relative prices. Because of these differences, or perhaps because of variations 
in taste or culture, there were international differences in vessel design, in the 
skill composition of crews, and in the organization of voyages. Thus, interna- 
tional differences in productivity could and did appear. The differences are 
both worthy of and readily susceptible to analysis. Pure productivity effects- 
including effects embodied in the capital stock, the human resources, and the 
institutional structure that regulated and constrained economic activity-seem 
easier to sort out in whaling than in most other industries. 
This chapter focuses on competition between the British northern fleet and 
the American Atlantic fleet in the years 1817-42. The American fleet captured 
some sperm whales, but the prize both primarily sought was the baleen whale. 
The areas hunted by  the British  included  Davis Strait, Greenland, and the 
North Atlantic. The American fleet hunted there, and in the Central and South 
Atlantic when winter drove it from the northern  water^.^ 
At the end of the War of 1812 the British fleet dominated world whaling, and 
more than two-thirds of the British effort was focused in the North Atlantic.6 In 
1816 British owners sent about 130 vessels to the northern fishery. Although 
the numbers fluctuated substantially from year to year, an annual average of 
more than 125 British vessels sailed for the North Atlantic between  1814 and 
1824 (McCulloch 1842, 163). In contrast, in the first peacetime year (1815) 
American owners sent no more than 20 vessels there. Twenty-seven years later, 
in  1843, the entire British fleet, northern and southern, had shrunk to fewer 
than 34 vessels. In that year the Americans could count almost 675 ships, barks, 
brigs, sloops, and schooners (Tower 1907, 121). 
To understand the dynamics of the competition, it is necessary to analyze 
the activities of the two fleets in the area in which they came into closest con- 
tact-the  North Atlantic.’ 
5.  It would be preferable to study fleets hunting over identical grounds, but this is impossible. 
Both fleets could have operated in the North and South Atlantic, but the British did not choose to 
send their vessels south in winter (see below) and the Americans usually did. The sperm whales 
appearing in the American records were taken chiefly in the Central and South Atlantic. 
6.  It is estimated that there were about 150 vessels in the northern fleet (vessels bound for Davis 
Strait and Greenland) in 1820. In the same year the southern fleet (vessels hunting in the South 
Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Indian Ocean) is estimated to have had  about 66 vessels (Jackson 
1978, 117, 136). (The number of  vessels in 1830 was extrapolated to 1820 on the tonnage of  the 
southern fleet to obtain the number of vessels in the fleet in 1820.) 
7. Data on the British northern fleet have been taken from British Parliamentary Papers and 
from Jenkins 1921: Jackson 1978: McCulloch 1842, 1854. The American data refer to New Bed- 
ford vessels hunting in the Atlantic and its northern reaches. The British northern fleet did not 
hunt in the Central and South Atlantic; they sought only baleen whales. In order to increase the 462  Chapter 12 
12.1  Styles of Whaling 
No family is better known in the annals of the British southern whale fishery 
than the Enderbys. Like the other old, established whaling houses-the  Cham- 
pions, the Mathers, and the Roaches-the  Enderbys were American expatri- 
ates. In 1787 they owned seven whalers; at the turn of the century they, together 
with the other three families, owned thirty-eight with an estimated value of 
&273,800.  Samuel senior, Samuel junior, and Charles Enderby were the leading 
spokesmen for the British industry from the late eighteenth century until the 
failure of  the Southern Whale Fishery Company, which Charles founded in 
1849 in a last attempt to “rehabilitate British whaling.” The company survived 
for only twenty months. When it went bankrupt, Charles Enderby attributed 
the British loss in the competitive struggle with the Americans to three factors: 
the failure of British vessel design, the failure of British seamen, and the high 
costs of British vessels (Jackson 1978,99, 142; Fairburn 1945-55,2:1008). To 
these should be added a fourth: changes in government policy. 
For almost a century before  1849 British whalers had received a stream of 
direct  and  indirect  government  subsidies. According  to William  Fairburn 
(1945-55,  2:  1007), “The whaling industry was not a success in Britain except 
during the years that the government supported it with bounties and warships.” 
From 1795 until 1824, a subsidy of twenty shillings a vessel ton (it had been 
forty until  1790) inflated the returns from a typical voyage by $1,302, while 
very high tariffs protected British whalers from foreign competition in the do- 
mestic market.8  In 1843, for example, when the price of whale oil in the Ameri- 
can market was $0.41 a gallon, the British tarifSon whale oil was $0.72 a 
gallon (tariff figure from Jackson 1978, 121). In this chapter the trends in Brit- 
ish and American productivity and profitability are compared, and an attempt 
is made to assess the relative contribution of each of the four factors-vessel 
design, vessel cost, the quality of seamen, and government policy-to  the mea- 
sured differences between the two fleets and to the eventual results of their 
competition. 
Although  whaling agents on both sides of the Atlantic had access to the 
same technology, there were important differences between the technical con- 
comparability of  the two  sets of  data,  we  have  omitted from consideration American voyages 
whose catch was at least 25 percent sperm oil by volume. See also appendix 12A. 
8. Over time the bounty payments fluctuated: 1734-39,  20 shillings per ton; 1740-49,  30 shil- 
lings; 1750-76,  40 shillings; 1777-81,  30 shillings; 1782-86,  40 shillings; 1787-91,30  shillings; 
1792-94,25 shillings; 1795-1824.20  shillings per ton (Jenkins 1921,306).  To make comparisons 
easier, all cost and revenue figures in this chapter have been denominated in US.  dollars of 1880. 
Michie (1977-78,  64, 68) says that, in the case of  Scottish whaling in 1763-74,  the bounty in- 
creased average profits from a negative 15.2 percent to a negative 2.2 percent. Over the profitable 
years 1800-1815 the bounty still accounted for a 3.5 percent return on investment for the Peterhead 
fleet (or almost one-tenth of its total profits) and a 4.3 percent return on investment for the Aber- 
deen fleet (more than one-fifth of its total profits). 463  The Americans Replace the British 
figurations of the British and American fleets. The British used larger vessels 
and adopted a configuration that displayed a much higher laborkapital ratio 
than did that of the Americans. British owners recalled their vessels after each 
hunting ~eason;~  most American vessels remained at sea for two or more sea- 
sons-an  important  difference.  The institutional  choice  did  not  affect  the 
mode of hunting whales; it did produce differences in the way  a carcass was 
handled when it was brought back to the vessel. Finally, the two sets of agents 
adopted very different methods of paying their seamen. 
In  1815 the typical British northern whaler measured 323 tons, the typical 
New Bedford Atlantic  whaler, only  168. Over time, the  size of  the average 
vessel rose in New Bedford  and fell in Britain.Io By the turn of  the decade 
there was little difference between the two: the British average was 302 tons 
(1841), the New Bedford, 283 tons (1838).” As Averch and Johnson (1962) 
have demonstrated for public utilities, when, because of the decisions of a reg- 
ulatory body, profits are in part geared to the size of the capital stock, under a 
wide variety of conditions a firm has an incentive to “gold plate”-that  is, to 
use more than a market cost-minimizing quantity of capital. In Great Britain 
the amount of the government subsidy was based on the registered tonnage of 
the vessel, so there was an incentive to use larger vessels than cost minimiza- 
tion would have called for. When the subsidy was cut off in 1824, the incentive 
disappeared. The decline in British  vessel  size can be traced in part to that 
event. 
It was costlier to build vessels in Great Britain than in the United States. 
Historians and contemporaries have generally agreed about the range of  the 
ratio of British to American vessel costs. It appears that, depending on time, 
place, and source, a British vessel cost between 1.5 and 2.2 times as much per 
ton as a similar vessel built in the United States (Hutchins 1941, 202). Higher 
construction costs, however, were partly offset by lower interest charges. Over 
the period 181  6 to 1842 the long-term yield of British 3 percent consols aver- 
aged 3.62 percent, and the safest American securities (in the earlier years Mas- 
sachusetts 5s [5% bonds], in the later, Boston City %), 4.96 percent.’* 
The typical British northern whaler was rigged as a ship, carried six or seven 
small boats, and employed forty to fifty men. The Brunswick, for example, 
signed on twenty-three  additional crew at Stromness, Orkney, on 21 March 
9. Michie (1977-78,  75) says that by the early 1850s, “[e]specially amongst the ships traveling 
the longer distance to Davis Strait, ‘wintering-out’ was adopted, though it remained an exception 
to normal practice.” Eber (1989, 11) says that the Americans introduced the practice in  1851. It 
may have been associated with the exploitation of Cumberland Sound. 
10. The size of British vessels actually increased over the first fifteen years. Chatterton (1926, 
47). for example, puts the average size of the Hull fleet at 330 tons per vessel in  1830. 
11. After 1838, however, New Bedford ships moved into the Pacific and Indian Ocean fisheries, 
and the American Atlantic fleet was again dominated by brigs, sloops, and schooners (see below). 
12. Homer and Sylla 1991, 195, 196,299,305. The U.S.  yields refer to Massachusetts 5s (1816- 
21) and Boston City 5s (1824, 1825, 1827, 1829, 1830, 1832-42). 464  Chapter 12 
1824. “With  a total  of  fifty he would  be  able to dispatch  seven five-oared 
whaleboats in pursuit of whales, with enough men left over to handle the ship” 
(Ross 1985,6). 
The New Bedford fleet was more diverse. Between  1816 and  1825 ships 
accounted for about one-half of the Atlantic voyages, brigs, sloops, and schoo- 
ners, the rest. Those proportions changed over time. In the mid-1830s virtually 
all Atlantic  voyages were conducted  by  ships. Then the proportions  shifted 
again; in the 1840s virtually all Atlantic vessels were of the three small types 
(brigs, schooners, and sloops) or were barks. An American vessel usually car- 
ried only four boats, and the crew averaged fewer than twenty-five (twenty- 
five on a ship, twenty  on a bark, fifteen on a smaller vessel).  Over the full 
period, however, despite the substitution of  the smaller barks, brigs, sloops, 
and schooners for the larger ships, average crew size rose from just fewer than 
twenty to just more than twenty-three. 
Differences in vessel and crew sizes gave the two fleets different labor/capi- 
tal ratios. On average an American vessel employed 0.08 men per ton, a British 
vessel, 0.14, during the months of active hunting. There is little evidence of a 
move toward a single laborkapital ratio. In the years 1817-26  the British used 
1.9 times as much labor per ton, and the ratio for 1836-42  was still 1.7. The 
disparity may reflect adjustment to differences in crew quality or in hunting 
style. Initially, it was probably also a response to the government’s requirement 
that an owner of  a British vessel sign two apprentices for each one hundred 
tons, if he wished to qualify for the tonnage bonus (Jackson 1978, 72; Crisp 
1954, 30). 
Weather in the North Atlantic and Davis Strait is foul. Between storms and 
the ice pack it was impossible to hunt for more than a few months in the late 
spring and summer. Vessels that failed to retreat south in time were caught in 
the ice-leading,  at best, to severe hardship, at worst, to sailors’ deaths and 
vessels’ destruction. In 1830 nineteen of the ninety-one vessels in the British 
fleet and one French whaler were destroyed by the ice pack. They included six 
double-bottomed and reinforced whalers, designed for the Arctic ground, that 
were smashed in a single accident. Attempting to shelter behind a large ice 
floe, the Eliza Swan, the St. Andrew, the BafJin, the Rattle< the Achilles, and 
the French Ville de Dieppe formed a line, bow to stem, and very close together. 
The floe was driven on the Eliza Swan and the St. Andrew, and “passing along 
the line dashed against [the other vessels] with such energy that within fifteen 
minutes these four strongly built, especially fortified whalers . . .  were. . . con- 
verted  into mere fragments  of wood.”13 Trapped vessels that escaped  being 
13. Chatterton  1926, 56-59,  62; Crisp  1954, 60-61.  Although the city did not lose its first 
whaling vessel until 1813, of a total of twenty Aberdeen ships involved in whaling over the years 
1800 to  1840, 60 percent were lost while whaling (Michie  1977-78,  69-70).  Overall the record 
was almost certainly not that bleak. Of the 2,561 voyages made to the northern ground over twenty- 
seven of  the twenty-eight years between  1815 and  1840 (the losses, if  any,  for  1839 were not 
reported), 112 vessels were lost at sea-about  4 percent of the total (McCulloch 1854, 642). 466  Chapter 12 
crushed fared little better. In  1836, for example, the British whaler Dee was 
caught in the freeze and remained icebound for five months and eight days 
(until 16 March  1837). By the time the ship returned to its home port (Aber- 
deen), forty-six men had died; another died later of illness contracted during 
the winter (Ross 1985, 89-107). 
British vessels went north each spring and returned to port when the hunting 
season was over. Except in an emergency, no major repairs were done at sea. 
Returning vessels were refitted  and repaired in the dockyards of their home 
ports, and blubber was refined at a shore-based refinery. 
For the Americans the journey south did not always mean a journey home. 
Instead  of  steering for New  Bedford  or Nantucket  each fall, many  vessels 
headed for the Central or South Atlantic and continued the hunt. American 
agents had concluded that it was more efficient to keep them out for at least 
two seasons. As a result repairs, even major ones, had to be made at sea. British 
vessels returning home each season required few skilled artisans; in a forty- to 
fifty-man crew there would be a cooper and probably a carpenter (Chatterton 
1926, 53). American crews, even though they were much smaller, almost al- 
ways included not only a cooper and a carpenter, but usually a blacksmith and 
often a sailmaker, boatbuilder, painter, mechanic, machinist, and caulker, or a 
second cooper, carpenter, or blacksmith. 
The difference in time at sea also had implications for the method of storing 
and transporting oil. In the British case, blubber was brought back unrefined. 
After a whale was killed, its carcass was towed to the ship and attached with 
blocks and tackle to the mast. The head was usually severed to make it easier 
to get at the baleen, “but a boat can enter the mouth of a whale, and, if neces- 
sary, several men could at the same time stand upright and be at work, remov- 
ing the whalebone from the upper jaw, the head of the whale being about one- 
third of the bulk of the creature (Ross 1985, 187). At the same time, under the 
direction of  the specksioneel; or head fat cutter, the expert of experts on the 
cutting of whales, men working from mollie boats and from the carcass itself 
flensed the blubber off the skeleton, and gummed (scraped) the bones.I4 The 
blocks of blubber were then hoisted on deck, trimmed by the krengers, skinned 
by skinners, sliced into small pieces by choppers, and pushed into the speck 
trough and down the lull (the process controlled by the lull-boy, equipped with 
nippers) to the hold where the skeeman and the king stored the pieces in barrels 
(Chatterton 1926, 132; Ross 1985,61-63). 
14. On Dutch whalers by the seventeenth century it was the specksioneer, not the captain, who 
was the final authority. This command structure was initially adopted by  the British, but by  the 
late eighteenth century, at least in the northern fleet, the framework had evolved dramatically. Even 
while whaling, the vessel was under the direct command of a regular seafaring captain, and “the 
specksioneer was merely a senior harpooner” (Chatterton  1926, 132). Not only had experience 
demonstrated conclusively that ship handling and navigation were very important, but captains had 
become experts on whales and their habits. Chatterton, however, says that, on American whalers as 
late as the early nineteenth century, the specksioneer still retained some of his earlier authority. 467  The Americans Replace the British 
The first stages of the American process were  similar, but instead of the 
cutters’ working from mollie boats, a cutting stage was rigged and the men 
worked from the stage. A winch was used to peel the blubber from the carcass, 
and the strips were cut into pieces aboard the vessel. For the British the disas- 
sembly process was complete when the blubber was barreled; for the Ameri- 
cans there was still much to do. Only after it had been minced and then boiled 
in the tryworks was the blubber, by now semirefined oil, stored in barrels. 
An average voyage for a British vessel was five and one-half  months,  and 
there is no evidence of  a trend over time. For the New Bedford sailors who 
worked the North Atlantic,  the average was almost fourteen months, and the 
figure rose from just over eleven and one-half months to just over eighteen in 
the years before 1843. It might appear that the British and the Americans drew 
from different pools of institutional technology, but this was not the case. Both 
technologies (one season and then home for repairs and refining, versus several 
seasons with some repairs and refining effected aboard ship) were known and 
available in both countries. Like the choice of different production technolo- 
gies  in  high-wage  low-interest  and  low-wage  high-interest  countries,  the 
choice of  an appropriate institutional structure was made by the agent-the 
entrepreneur who managed the voyage. 
Theory  suggests that his choice was  dictated by  the desire to maximize 
profits, but the initial conditions were very different in Great Britain than in 
the United States-leading  the British entrepreneur to choose short voyages, 
the American, longer ones. In the first place, although American vessels did at 
times shift from whaling to the merchant service and vice versa, while they 
were in the whaling fleet (with few exceptions) they focused solely on whaling. 
For the British northern fleet, whaling was often a part-time activity, an enter- 
prise of choice in the off-season for the merchant trade or, a somewhat more 
permanent transfer, when that trade was in the doldrums. It was not unusual 
for a vessel to operate as a whaler in the summer and transfer to the coastal or 
Baltic trade in the winter. 
In the  second place,  profits  are maximized  within a  structure of  relative 
prices. To the British entrepreneur, effective relative prices, as opposed to those 
observed in the market, were until  1824 biased by the mechanism chosen by 
his government to distribute the bounty payment. A British shipowner was paid 
a lump-sum subsidy per registered ton for each voyage to the northern fishery, 
and the Board of Customs counted each round trip from home port to home 
port as a voyage. In the same way that the institutional mechanism-the  sub- 
sidy-induced  businessmen to choose larger vessels than market prices would 
have dictated, the government’s policy led British agents to bring their vessels 
back at the end of each season. Consider what might have happened had the 
Board of Customs chosen the same mechanism for distributing the subsidy to 
the northern fleet as to the southern. In that case a premium of E.500  was paid 
to each of the four vessels returning with the largest catch, rapidly declining 468  Chapter 12 
bonuses to some predetermined  number of other ships that performed  well, 
and  nothing  at  all  to  those  who  returned  relatively  empty (Jackson  1978, 
It has often been suggested that relative voyage lengths explain the differ- 
ences in the structure of  labor payments. Whether or not that is correct, the 
institutions that evolved  in  the  two  countries  were quite  different.I5 In  the 
United  States, in  addition to subsistence  and occasional  supplements, each 
crew member was paid a specified fraction of  the net revenue earned on the 
voyage. The sum of these lay payments rose from about 3 1 percent of net reve- 
nues in the early 1840s to about 36 percent in the mid-1850s (see table 5.15). 
In Britain the payment was a mix of monthly wages, bonuses that were “catch” 
dependent, and until  1824 some fraction of the government tonnage subsidy. 
Despite the higher laborkapital ratio on British ships, annual payments to la- 
bor were lower than in the United States. The effect of larger crew size was 
more than offset by the shorter length of the voyage. Thus, labor costs (exclu- 
sive of  subsistence) on British  vessels  averaged 24 percent  of  revenues  per 
voyage of five and one-half months in the profitable years  1817-36.  (See ap- 
pendix 12C.) 
A seaman of each country generated about the same amount of revenue per 
year, but the cost of  a year’s work by a British seaman was about two-fifths 
more than the cost of  an American’s work. Moreover, there are at least three 
reasons to think that this 40 percent  differential, large as it is, represents a 
lower bound on the effective ratio of the cost of British seamen to the cost of 
American seamen. First, because of the differential demand generated by the 
need to repair and refit at sea, there was a much higher concentration of artisans 
on American vessels. Second, the British government continued to attempt to 
entice American whalemen to relocate in England or Scotland and lend their 
services to the British effort. Finally, in the southern fishery, despite an average 
total lay of 44 percent, British owners were unable to attract seamen as skilled 
as the Americans. Thus, on average the quality of American crews was proba- 
bly higher, and an adjustment for those quality differences would push the ratio 
above 1.4. 
96-97). 
12.2  Productivity Differentials 
On the one hand, the victory achieved by the American industry might be 
explained purely in terms of  market opportunities. That is, both fleets might 
have been equally productive, but the Americans might have been favored by 
locational factors, lower input prices (lower opportunity costs for labor, for 
example), or more favorable treatment at the hands of their government.  On 
15. In the southern fishery, where voyages were longer, the British used a system of payment 
very similar to the American. Both made the lay the major component of  the remuneration pack- 
age. See Jackson 1978, 100; chapter 5 above. 469  The Americans Replace the British 
the other hand, the victory might have resulted from differences  in physical 
productivity, produced by a better choice of technology (either narrowly tech- 
nical or broadly institutional), higher qualities of nationality-tied inputs (either 
capital or labor), or better entrepreneurial skills. 
The productivity index introduced in chapter 1 and used extensively in the 
analysis of American  productivity  change (chapter  8) can, with only minor 
adjustments, provide the basis for a comparison of the physical productivities 
of the two fleets. In this formulation only two outputs are distinguished: whale 
oil and baleen. New Bedford whalers returned from the North Atlantic with 
some sperm oil, which has been treated in the calculations as whale oil. This 
procedure biases  the  estimated relative  American productivity  downward. 
Nineteenth-century  whalemen  recognized  that more resources were required 
to produce a barrel of sperm oil than of whale oil, and the long-run relative 
price of the two commodities confirms that view. 
As before, no allowance is made for vessels lost at sea; only those that re- 
turned to port are included. The issues involved in incorporating  lost vessels 
(and men) are complex. In any case both fleets displayed virtually identical loss 
rates; ignoring losses should not affect relative levels of estimated productivity. 
Labor is measured in man-months, capital, in ton-months-the  tons refer- 
ring to registered vessel capacity. The British and American formulas for mea- 
suring tonnage were not identical, but it is likely that the differences cancel 
out.I6 The tonnage measures were probably similar and are assumed to be iden- 
tical for the purposes of the calculations. 
One major problem remains. Records indicate that, upon returning from a 
voyage,  an American crew was  paid  off. Although  there  were  substantial 
voyage-to-voyage differences, the typical vessel remained in port for sixty to 
seventy-five days (see note 20), during which time it was refitted and outfitted. 
At the end of the refitting  and with a new crew aboard, it again put to sea. 
British vessels returned after only five and one-half months at sea and did not 
set out again until an additional six and one-half months had passed. For Amer- 
16. The British and American formulas for estimating vessel capacity were similar, but not 
identical (see chapter 6). If all measurements were made in the same way, the U.S. rule would 
result in measured tonnages just over 1 percent smaller than those produced by the British rule. 
Measurements, however, were not made in the same way. In both countries breadth was to be 
measured at the widest place-in  the words of  the British law, “from the outside of the outside 
plank in the broadest part of the ship.”  For  the British the measurement was “exclusive of  all 
manner of doubling planks that may be  wrought upon the sides of the ship”; the American rule 
makes no mention of deductions. Since northem whalers were often doubled and sheathed, the 
American system probably produced wider breadths than did the British. Both countries called for 
measures of length from stem post to stem post; in the American case the measurement was made 
above the main deck, in the British case, along the keel, with an allowance made for the overhang 
of the bow but not the stem. Again, the American dimension was probably slightly larger than the 
British (McCulloch 1842,977;  An Act for Registering and Clearing Vessels, Regulating the Coast- 
ing Trade, and for Other Purposes, 1789, Srars. ar  Large of  USA 13-65). 
The British rule changed in 1836, but vessels built before that date were allowed to retain their 
original measurements. In our calculations all British whalers were assumed to have been built 
before 1836. 470  Chapter 12 
Table 12.1  Total Factor Productivity, British Northern Fleet and American (New 
Bedford) Atlantic Fleet, 1817-42  (percentages) 
A. American Productivity as % of British Productivity 
Variant S  Variant L  Variant M 
18  17-25  74  107  139 
1826-35  78  107  131 
1836-42  122  187  243 
1817-42  89  129  164 
B. Indexes of American and British Productivity, Base 1817-25,  Variant L 
us.  Great Britain 
18 17-25  I00  100 
1826-35  121  121 
1836-42  69  39 
Sources; See the text and appendix 12A. 
ican vessels the time spent in port  was needed  to refit  and outfit.  Refitting 
certainly did not take three and one-quarter times as long in Britain. The ques- 
tion is, what happened to the British vessel and crew during that six-and-one- 
half-month hiatus? 
In an attempt to work around this problem, three sets of productivity indexes 
were calculated (see table 12.1). They differ in their measurement of the time 
dimension of the two inputs: man-months and ton-months. Variant S (time at 
sea) uses months at sea. Clearly, since the procedure makes no allowance for 
the time  ships were down during refitting  or for unemployment  among the 
crew between voyages, variant S understates the true volumes of capital and 
labor used by the industry. In the American case the understatement of labor is 
probably slight; the fleet was expanding and vessels sailed regularly, regardless 
of season, so that a seaman discharged after one voyage could usually sign on 
for another immediately, if he chose. That was not the case for British seamen, 
who at the end of a voyage would have to wait more than six months to ship 
again in the northern fleet. In the meantime British seamen could seek employ- 
ment in other activities to tide them over, but there was no guarantee of reem- 
ployment. 
The variant S estimates thus understate the volume of inputs used by the two 
fleets,  thereby overstating productivity.  The overstatement is greater for the 
British, and consequently the estimates overvalue the comparative productivity 
levels of the British fleet. 
The variant M (maximum inputs) estimates rest on the assumption that both 
men and vessels were held out of other gainful activity when they were not 
whaling. Given the relative sea times of the two fleets, variant M maximizes 
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If some part of  the downtime imputed to British vessels in variant M was 
actually spent in another productive activity (the coasting trade, for example), 
the estimates would  exaggerate  the  relative  productivity  of  the American 
fleet-but  not  badly. The opportunities  for off-season  employment  open to 
British whalers would have been second-best alternatives (why else would an 
owner risk his capital in the waters off Greenland or in Davis Strait during the 
whaling season?), much less productive than whaling.” 
A similar argument can be made for the biases inherent in variant M’s as- 
sumption that there was no alternate employment for workers. No plausible 
maritime alternative could have employed a majority of  the fifty-man British 
crew, most of  whom had little traditional maritime  experience. A large part 
of a British crew would have been either unemployed or forced to take less 
remunerative, unskilled positions ashore during the long period between voy- 
ages. Why would a man risk life and limb in northern waters if he had a close 
employment substitute available? Nevertheless, the most likely estimate of rel- 
ative productivities  is not the M estimate, but something between variants S 
and M: that vessels were usually employed in the off-season, and a fraction, 
no more than one-third, of the crew transferred with their vessel to mercantile 
pursuits. 
Finally both of these indexes incorporate three recognized biases, each of 
which leads to an understatement of American relative productivity. First, the 
British brought back unprocessed  blubber; Americans tryed  out the blubber 
aboard ship and returned with semirefined oil. A correct productivity compari- 
son would require that some additional labor and capital be assigned to British 
production to adjust for the resources used by the Americans in the first stage 
of the refining process. Second, the inclusion of skilled craftsmen in the Ameri- 
can crews meant that a great deal of refitting and repair was done at sea. Shore- 
based shipyard workers, of course, were employed when the vessel returned 
home. The British employed shipyard workers in their home ports for almost 
all refitting and repair. Variant S picks up none of  those workers, and variant 
M captures only a part of the labor done ashore. Variant M assumes the crew 
stayed with the vessel while it was in port, and the crewmen could have been 
used to refit. British crewmen were seamen, however, not artisans; unaided, 
they could not have carried out many of the repairs needed after a season in the 
northern seas. Third, the British brought back only whale oil, the Americans, a 
17. Michie (1977-78,69)  finds evidence of  vessels used in the off-season in the Baltic, Atlantic, 
Mediterranean, and coastal trades. For example, he cites the case of  “two Aberdeen whaling ships, 
the June and the Neptune,” that “returned from a voyage to America in February 1809 in time to 
sail at the end of  the month for the whale-fishing,” He also says that owners needed to keep their 
vessels regularly at work in profitable undertakings and, in the years 1800 to 1820, “[wlhaling was 
proving sufficiently attractive. . .  because of good catches and high profits, and so shipping moved 
into the whaling trade.” If this argument is correct, it suggests that the tonnage bonus was sufficient 
to make whaling more attractive than the merchant marine, but the industry without the subsidy 
was not as profitable. If it had been, entrepreneurs would have adopted the American institutional 
technology of longer voyages. 472  Chapter 12 
mix of whale and sperm oil. To the extent that, in the long run, prices reflect 
real costs, sperm whales must have been more costly (i.e., required more labor 
and capital) to catch than baleens. Between 1816 and 1845 the price of sperm 
oil was, on average, 2.3 times that of whale oil. Both index variants assume 
that a gallon of  oil was a gallon of oil, thus tending to understate U.S. relative 
productivity. 
The variant L (most likely) estimates were produced to deal at least roughly 
with some of these biases and to establish productivity levels between the lim- 
iting S and M variants that would more closely approach the truth. They make 
three adjustments to the data underlying variant S. First, American output lev- 
els are raised by  10 percent,  to take into account both  the trying out of oil 
aboard American whalers and the fact that some of the oil they brought back 
was the more valuable sperm oil.‘s 
Second, the time dimension  of  the capital  input for both the British and 
American fleets is taken to be the time at sea plus two and one-half months for 
refitting between  voyages. The typical  (mean) refitting  period  for American 
vessels was, in fact, about two and one-half months (table 6.7). British vessels 
were a shorter time at sea, which might suggest that they required less refitting. 
They hunted exclusively in the harsh Arctic environment, however; American 
whalers  spent only part  of  their time in the Arctic.  Furthermore,  American 
vessels carried artisans who were able to make some repairs  at sea. Finally, 
British whalers that operated in the coasting or Baltic trade in the off-season 
would need to be refitted twice, once to clean and prepare them for mercantile 
service, once to refit them as whalers. It seems unlikely, then, that British whal- 
ers required less time to refit than did American whalers, and they may have 
required more. 
It is not clear that all British northern vessels found employment in the off- 
season, or that those that did were as productively engaged then as when hunt- 
ing whales. The third adjustment is to assume that British whalers and crew- 
men were  only three-quarters  as productive  in the off-season  as during the 
whaling season. Even with these adjustments, the variant L estimates are likely 
to be biased against a showing of high American productivity. 
The estimates were made in the manner described in chapter 8 (for further 
details see appendix 12A), which yields productivity indexes expressed in nat- 
ural logs. The antilogs were then taken and used to compute the figures in table 
12.1. The indexes are highly volatile from one year to the next. To get a clear 
sense of the relative performance levels of the two fleets, it is necessary  to 
study multiyear averages, and such averages  appear in table  12.1. The three 
variants give very different results, but the preferred estimates (variant L) sug- 
gest that in the period  1817-35  the productivity levels of the two fleets were 
18. Michie (1977-78,  71) places the 1846 cost of “boiling and coopering” at El a ton (tun) or 
about 2.3 cents a gallon-about  7 percent of the American price. Since the whale-oil market was 
competitive, that figure must also reflect about 7 percent of the cost of  the oil. 473  The Americans Replace the British 
close (panel A). The Americans seem to have been a little more productive, 
and the true margin of difference is almost certainly greater than the figures in 
the table show. 
In the period 1835-42,  when the American fleet came into its own, the pro- 
ductivity gap became very wide. Even the variant S estimates, seriously biased 
against a finding of high American productivity, show that the American fleet 
was more productive. The measured gap, according to variant S, was 22 per- 
cent; the true difference was more likely between 87 percent (variant L) and 
143 percent (variant M). 
The dramatic relative American  gain shown in panel A was not due to a 
dramatic improvement in American productivity. As chapter 8 shows, Ameri- 
can whaling productivity fell during this period, in the Atlantic fleet as well as 
the entire industry (table 12.1, panel B). The relative American gain resulted 
from an even greater drop in British productivity. Why was the experience of 
the British fleet in this period so unsatisfactory? The fleet had been shrinking 
and now consisted of very few vessels. Average productivity reflected a rela- 
tively small number of unsuccessful voyages. As the fleet shrank, it may have 
lost its best vessels and men. The few voyages at the end may have been con- 
ducted  by  thoroughly  depreciated  hulks  from  which  agents  were trying to 
squeeze a last bit of revenue. Finally, the sharp decline in productivity may 
have reflected a thinning out of whale stocks in the northern grounds, due ei- 
ther to overhunting or to the passage of whale groups under the Arctic ice cap 
to the Western Arctic, a ground not yet hunted (Jackson 1978, 126-30). 
One probable reason the American fleet was more successful is that it was 
less dependent  on the  northern grounds; its versatility  served it well. Also, 
unlike the British, the American fleet was expanding and drawing to it able 
agents, captains, officers, and boatsteerers. Eventually, the Americans had trou- 
ble maintaining the quality of their corps of seamen (see chapter 8) in the face 
of the strong labor demands created by the expansion of the fleet. Nonetheless, 
there was a vitality to the industry at this time that could not be matched in 
Great Britain. 
12.3  Differential Profitability 
The productivity indexes show that resources devoted to whaling by Ameri- 
can firms produced, on average, more oil and bone than the same quantities of 
labor and capital did when applied to the same task by British firms. It is profit, 
however, not productivity that induces entrepreneurs to organize economic ac- 
tivity, capitalists to provide vessels and whalecraft, and workers to leave the 
farm for a life before the mast. 
Relative profits are not easy to estimate. Not only are the British aggregate 
data open to questions of interpretation, but there are theoretical problems as 
well, stemming from the part-time nature of British whaling. On the one hand, 
if whaling was a secondary activity-pursued  only when there were no mer- 474  Chapter 12 
cantile opportunities-then  any return over total variable cost represented  a 
net gain to the primary activity. On the other hand, if management  chose to 
engage in the Baltic or coasting trade only to make use of vessels when weather 
prevented Arctic whaling, then total whaling profits were the profits earned in 
whaling plus any return  above total variable costs earned in the mercantile 
trade. 
If  the two  activities  are assumed  to have  been  competitive,  however,  it 
should be possible to estimate whaling profits directly. Assume that the coast- 
ing and Baltic trades were competitive with whaling and that they could be 
pursued year round. Then, if firms chose to whale in the summer, not only must 
the profits in whaling have been higher than those that could have been earned 
in the merchant  service, but also they must represent  the actual profits from 
whaling. In short, it is as if there were two firms-a  whaling firm that operated 
in the summer and a mercantile service that operated the rest of the year.I9  We 
have  assumed that  this  institutional  structure  best  characterizes  the  British 
fleet, and that assumption provides the basis for the profitability  calculations 
reported in this section. 
Table 12.2 gives several alternative estimates of the average profits that were 
(or might have been) earned by a British entrepreneur, as well as those of  his 
American competitors.2" The two sets of British estimates in panel A and col- 
umn 1 of panel B reflect two alternative assumptions about the relative cost of 
British vessels and outfits (see appendix 12B). Panel A shows that before 1836 
both fleets were making good profits, but thereafter profits fell, disastrously 
for the British. These patterns are very similar to those of the productivity data. 
The contrasts between  panel A  and panel  B,  column  1, however,  are of 
greater interest. The panel A estimates are based on the total revenues actually 
19. Again, of course, this set of assumptions implies that the merchant service was more proft- 
able than off-season whaling in the Central and South Atlantic. Moreover, each of the three pos- 
sible assumptions about industrial structure opens the possibility that the decline in British whaling 
could be attributed, at least in part, to the declining profitability of the Baltic trade, as trade patterns 
shifted, andor of the coasting trade, as railroads offered increased competition. 
20. The U.S. profit  figures are voyage figures from the New Bedford fleet averaged by  year. 
Revenues were calculated by multiplying each element of  the annual catch (whale oil, sperm oil, 
and whalebone) by its average price in the year of the vessel's return. Costs included (1) deprecia- 
tion, (2) value of vessels lost at sea, (3) cost of outfitting the vessel, (4) forgone interest, (5)  wages, 
and (6) crew maintenance. See appendix 12B. British profits were calculated similarly, except that 
the sources were not voyage records but aggregate studies and reports on part or all of the whaling 
fleet. These sources include Jenkins 1921;  Scoresby [I8201 1969; Jackson 1978; McCulloch 1842; 
House of Commons 1845. All other estimates are drawn from the sources cited. See appendix 12B. 
The American profit  calculations are based on the assumption that vessels remained in port 
between voyages for an average of 2.5 months-a  figure that almost certainly represents an upper 
bound. Both the median and the modal stay in port for all New Bedford voyages returning from 
the Atlantic ground between 1817 and 1843 was 2.0 months. If, on the assumption that any vessel 
that did not put to sea on another whaling voyage for more than 10 months after it returned was 
actually up for sale or engaged in some alternative nonwhaling activity, the distribution of  obser- 
vations on port time is truncated at that figure, the mean for all 1817-43  Atlantic voyages is 2.3 
months. Of the 21 1 observations 119 have port times of less than 2 months and another twenty of 
less than 3. 475  The Americans Replace the British 
Table 12.2  Profit Rates, British Northern Fleet and American (New Bedford) 
Atlantic Fleet, 1817-42 
A. Actual Rates 
us.  Great Britain 
~~ 
1817-25  16.2  7.2 to 22.8 
1826-35  17.6  28.5 to 51.8 
1836-42  7.9  -  18.6 to -  15.0 
B. British Counterfactual Rates" 
Fleet Required to Use  Fleet Allowed to Use 
British Vessels  American Vessels 
18  17-25  -9.6  to -0.3  4.4 
1826-35  -  14.0 to -6.6  -3.7 
1836-42  -27.3  to -26.6  -32.5 
Sources: See appendix 12B. 
"Rates  the British fleet would have earned, had the fleet received no subsidies or tariff protection. 
received by British shipowners. They include earnings from the subsidy as well 
as from the sale of oil and bone at tariff-inflated domestic prices. The panel B 
estimates  represent  the  hypothetical  revenues  that  shipowners  would  have 
earned had there been no subsidy and had they been forced to market their 
output at prices that prevailed in the United States (i.e., prices unaffected by 
the British tariff). Finally, the data in panel B, column 2, describe the profit 
rates British owners would have earned if there had been no tariffs or subsidies, 
but they had been able to buy American vessels.21 
Two conclusions stand out. First, if the British government had pursued a 
hands-off  policy (that is, no bounties, no tariffs, and no military blockades) 
but had continued to demand that owners use British-built vessels, it is highly 
unlikely that there would have been any British whaling industry. By the lower 
estimate of the cost of British vessels (1.5 times the American cost), profits in 
all three  periods  would  have been  negative.  Nor  would  the  substitution of 
American for British vessels have improved the situation much (panel B, col- 
umn 2). At the same time, the owners of American whalers were earning pure 
profits of between 7.9 and 17.6 percent. 
Second, given the actual levels of government support, profits in Great Brit- 
ain were easily sufficient to command new investment until the mid-1830s. 
British whaling profits in the period 1817-25  fell into the 7 to 23 percent range, 
and these returns were in addition to implicit interest, computed at competitive 
21. Oddly enough, loss rates would have been higher if US.  hulls had been used in place of 
British hulls. Losses would have been lower with American hulls, but, since U.S.  hulls were so 
much cheaper than British hulls, investment itself would have been lower and loss rates would 
have been higher. 476  Chapter 12 
rates.  Between  1826 and  1835 earning rates were even higher. They almost 
certainly approached 30 and may have been over 50 percent. 
After 1835, despite the continued protection afforded by the tariff, the Brit- 
ish industry was in severe straits. Whatever the measure of vessel cost, profits 
were negative on average, and substantially so. Losses more than wiped out 
imputed interest. No wonder the industry contracted rapidly. 
The analysis to this point has laid out the chief differences between the two 
fleets, but it has not systematically explored the roots of the poor performance 
of the British. There are data that allow the issues to be sorted out. The rela- 
tively high prices of the vessels that the British were forced to employ were 
partly to blame. In order to protect the domestic shipbuilding industry, Parlia- 
ment prohibited the importation of foreign-built vessels in the Navigation Acts 
(repealed in 1849). A potential shipowner who wished to sail under the British 
flag and to enjoy the protection of both  the navy and the tariff had to use a 
vessel that had been built  in Great Britain or one of its colonies. When the 
American states ceased to be colonies, their vessels were included in the prohi- 
bition. Had the battle of the North Atlantic been fought thirty years later, Brit- 
ish whalemen could have turned to Canadian shipyards for vessels that were 
as good as their American counterparts and sold for even lower prices; in the 
1830s and 1840s the Canadian shipbuilding industry was still in its infancy- 
capable of exporting fewer than one hundred poor-quality vessels a year. (In 
1860, or even in 1850-when  they could have turned to American shipyards- 
there were few whaling entrepreneurs left in either England or Scotland.22) 
Even if British owners had been able to use American-built vessels while 
continuing to sell their oil in the protected domestic market, it is unlikely that 
the industry would have remained economically viable after the mid-1830s. 
Using American-built vessels would have yielded positive profits in  18  17-25 
and 1826-35, but over the last seven years (1836-42)  not even that would have 
made British whaling profitable. 
A complete  substitution of American for British  vessels  would  not have 
22. The anti-American prohibition was contained in 26 Geo. 111 c. 60, an extension of the Navi- 
gation Acts that dealt with the registration of vessels from the “now American colonies.” The law 
was finally repealed in 1849. See Hutchins 1941, 175. 
During the years in question the Canadian industry was not in a position to meet the demands 
of the whaling industry. Its “vessels, which in model resembled the American cargo ships, were 
generally constructed at first of relatively poor hardwoods, and later of Canadian spruce, which 
timbers were often used unseasoned, were frequently of light scantling [the dimensions of timber 
in breadth and depth], and were commonly poorly fitted and fastened.” The Canadian vessels were, 
however, inexpensive. In 1840 they sold for about three-fourths as much as those built in the yards 
south of the border. By 1860 the industry had expanded, quality had improved, and relative prices 
had fallen. Canadian shipyards had  become a force to be reckoned with in  world  shipbuilding 
(Hutchins 1941, 300-301). 
Although there were still nearly forty vessels employed in the northern fishery during the early 
1860s (the average for 1861-64  was thirty-eight), most of their activity was directed toward hunt- 
ing seals rather than whales. Over the decade  1848-57,  for example, those vessels brought hack 
on average 11  1 whales a year. At the same time they were returning 95,927 seals. The seals were 
valued for both oil and fur (Jackson 1978, 145-46). 477  The Americans Replace the British 
saved the industry had there been no bounty and had British whalemen been 
forced to compete with Americans in the British domestic market. Selling at 
American output prices, they would rarely have been able even to cover im- 
puted interest on investment. 
It seems that Fairburn is correct: British whaling was a creature of war and 
government policy. Before the Boston Tea Party, the New England colonies 
supplied four-fifths of the whale oil sold in the British market (Jackson  1978, 
66). Early  in  1783  British  owners  were  faced  by  Yankee  whalers  in  the 
Thames, “with full cargoes of oil of excellent quality , . . offered below the 
prevailing London price” (Fairburn 1945-55,2:996). Given the industry’s his- 
tory, the Yankees should not have been surprised that their attempt to penetrate 
the British domestic market was met by the government’s imposing a prohibi- 
tive tariff on whale oil and by one more formal attempt to induce Nantucket 
whalemen to shift their base of operations to Great Britain. In a free market 
the advantage goes to the low-cost, efficient producer, but how many markets 
are free? In a market that is not free, the advantage goes to the producer with 
the most political clout. In the 1780s the political position of British whalemen 
and whale oil merchants was strong (they had, after all, no domestic competi- 
tors), and was reinforced  by  the  international  situation. A  militarily  strong 
France lay across the Channel, and it was obvious to all that the Royal Navy 
was the island nation’s first line of defense. 
For an industry long dependent on the good offices of the government, it is 
not surprising that the absolute and relative decline in the profitability of Brit- 
ish whaling can, in part, be traced to changes in government policy, but this is 
not the only explanation. The two economies-Great  Britain and the United 
States-developed  at different rates and in somewhat different directions, with 
implications for the relative profitability of the two whaling fleets-at  least in 
the short term. 
On the one hand, government policy did change, and with it profits. In 1824 
the government, bowing to free-trade sentiment and pressure from the manu- 
facturing sector, broke with half a century of  tradition and refused to renew 
the tonnage bounty. One historian has maintained that its value was “[slo slight 
. . . that its passing was hardly noticed,” but the bounty had accounted for be- 
tween one-fifth and one-fourth of the industry’s profits over the nine preceding 
years (Jackson 1978, 119). 
Similarly, although the tariff  on whale oil remained  high  until  1843, the 
impost on the importation of  some substitutes was cut sharply  at an earlier 
date. Take the case of rapeseed oil. Wool is cleansed with oil before it is spun. 
Ideally, a manufacturer would use oil made from the seed of the rape plant, but 
whale oil could be substituted in producing cheaper ~10th.~~  The price of whale 
23. Jackson  1978, 55. Jackson’s evidence  is from the testimony of Jervis Walker before the 
Select Committee to Examine into the Policy of Imposing an Increased Duty on  the Import of 
Foreign Seeds in  18 16. Rape is an Old World annual (Brassica  nupus) akin to the turnip. 478  Chapter 12 
oil-even  after the duty had been paid-was  much less than the tariff-inflated 
price of rapeseed  oil, and industrial demand was substantial. Between  1816 
and 1820 political efforts by owners of whalers and whale oil merchants were 
directed to holding the price of rapeseed oil above E50 a ton. Between  1822 
and 1827 the duty on rapeseed was gradually cut from El to 1  shilling (from 
$4.54 to $0.24) a quarter. Over the same period, imports of seed rose by 650 
percent (Jackson 1978, 120-21). 
On the other hand, government policy is not totally exogenous. In the United 
States, demand for whale oil declined after camphene, coal oil, kerosene, and 
manufactured gas became available. These products, however, did not reach 
the American market in significant quantities until after midcentury. In Great 
Britain the first coal gas company was chartered in London in 1782, and by 
1820 gasworks had been built in many of the larger towns. Despite major ex- 
plosions in London, Edinburgh, and Manchester, by 1823 “the superiority and 
convenience of gas was . . .  beyond dispute.” In London alone, the forty-seven 
gasometers had a capacity of 917,000 cubic feet.24  The substitution of gas for 
whale oil had gone so far that in the 1820s whale oil merchants, in an attempt 
to regain their lost market share, began to manufacture gas from whale oil. 
This was technically feasible; the enterprise foundered  because  of the rela- 
tively high price of whale oil. 
The British and American responses to new technologies raise an important, 
but little understood, issue about the long-run  effects of government policy. 
Why did the Americans lag in the innovation  of  whale oil substitutes? How 
much of  the lag can be attributed to differences in the structures of  the two 
economies (the degree of urbanization, for example), and how much to differ- 
ences in the relative prices of  whale oil and coal, reflecting the high British 
tariff on whale oil? 
Given that it was saddled with a cost structure that made it noncompetitive 
in the international market, no tariff or bounty within reason could have sup- 
ported the British industry in the face of an almost complete dearth of domestic 
demand. It is not surprising that, when in 1843 Her Majesty’s government re- 
duced the tariff on whale oil from $0.72 to $0.16 a gallon, the effect was felt 
by only twenty-five shipowners and hardly more than one thousand seamen.25 
12.4  Conclusions 
At the end of the Napoleonic wars, British whalemen enjoyed a near monop- 
oly of the fishery. The Dutch had turned to other maritime pursuits, the Royal 
24. Jackson 1978, 123. Jackson’s source is the testimony of  Humphrey David before the Select 
Committee on Gas Light Establishments in 1823. 
25. Jackson 1978, 121, 129. In 1843 the duty on whale oil was reduced from €27 18s 7d per 
tun to €6 6s. In 1843 there were twenty-five ships with 1,146 men engaged in the northern fishery, 
but in the two previous years the numbers had been nineteen and eighteen vessels, with 897 and 
830 men, respectively. 479  The Americans Replace the British 
Navy had eliminated American competition, and government subsidies had in- 
creased revenues. British whaling was profitable. After Yorktown, tariffs had 
replaced naval squadrons as barriers to foreign competition in the British do- 
mestic market, and during the Napoleonic wars the Royal Navy, charged with 
isolating Europe, provided de facto protection in most of the rest of the markets 
in the developed world. In 1814 almost two hundred British whalers hunted in 
the northern and southern fisheries; fewer than five American whaling vessels 
were active. 
Twenty-seven years later the American fleet was almost seven hundred ves- 
sels, the British, thirty-four. With equal access to the stock of natural resources 
and to the menu of alternative technologies, the two fleets had met in head-to- 
head competition in the waters off Greenland and in Davis Strait. In the study 
of the relationships among productivity, policy, and economic change, the mi- 
crocosm that was the northern fishery is a nearly ideal historical laboratory. 
What factors explain the shift in industrial leadership from the Old World to 
the New? Was it rooted in emerging differences in underlying productivity, to 
differences in input or  output  prices,  or to changes in the economic envi- 
ronment? 
The evidence indicates that all three factors contributed. On average, Ameri- 
can productivity was higher than British, but it was probably not enough higher 
to account fully for the observed differences in profitability, even in the years 
1836-42,  when the productivity gap was very wide. Still, it is comforting to 
note that the productivity and profit estimates move in parallel. British profit 
rates did fall drastically, as British relative productivity fell. 
The British were less productive, and they ultimately became substantially 
less profitable. In the middle decade (1  826-35)  the productivity difference nar- 
rowed, and the British whalers proved themselves to be more profitable than 
their American competitors. If in that period the British had been able to oper- 
ate  in  the  protected  domestic  market  but  had  been  permitted  to employ 
American-built vessels, they would, on average, have earned very much more 
than their Nantucket and New Bedford peers. Other “it might have been” esti- 
mates, however, indicate that, despite the profits that could have been earned 
if  only the world had been different, low British productivity had important 
implications for the industry’s long-term survival. Even American-built vessels 
would not have saved the British whaling fleet, had the owners been forced to 
face American competition in the domestic market for whale oil and baleen. 
Higher wages and vessel costs depressed British profits, but they do not 
account  for the  measured  productivity  gap. The question  remains,  why,  if 
larger crews and  shorter voyages were both unproductive and unprofitable, 
didn’t British owners and captains adjust to the superior American technology? 
That they did not adjust suggests that, in the British economic environment, 
American technology was not superior. 
The answer may lie in the quality of British crews. The literature is replete 
with horror stories about the sailors who manned those vessels. Jackson (1978, 480  Chapter 12 
72-73),  writing about the northern fishery during the period of its most rapid 
growth, has little good to say about the British decision “to recruit ‘Greenmen’, 
a term which had nothing to do with Greenland, but indicated that they were 
new to the job-and  therefore cheaper. . . . [Tlhe Robert of Peterhead . . . in 
1795 had only two  ‘sailors’ among its crew of twenty-three.  The final stage 
. . . came when even the cheapest native crews were swelled by half-starved 
wretches picked up for a song in the Shetlands.” 
Nor does the quality of the crews seem to have improved  over time. An 
owner appearing before a parliamentary select committee testified that British 
seamen, who had been, in his words, “the best sailors in the world” in  1801 
were in 1844 “the worst description.”26  It should be noted that 1801 was only 
six years after the crews had been “swelled by half-starved  wretches.” Mean- 
while, American “crews, bred in the trade and enthusiastic in their pursuit of 
it, were said to be better whalermen than the British” (Jackson 1978, 141). 
Although it is difficult to sort out cause and effect, crew quality may have 
affected  productivity  not  only  directly  but  also  indirectly  through  voyage 
length. British vessels usually carried a carpenter and perhaps his mate, and a 
cooper, but few other artisans (Jenkins 1921, 189). American vessels carried 
a wide range of  skilled workmen, including painters, boatmakers, and even 
machinists. The British had to depend on shore-based workmen for the bulk 
of their refitting and repair. The Americans were able to effect maintenance 
and repair during the voyage itself; in fact, these were primary activities  on 
American  vessels  during  the  winter  when  weather  and  ice  pushed  vessels 
southward. Without thoroughly revamping their staffing policies, it would have 
been impossible for British owners to adopt American cruising schedules. 
And there was no economic reason for the British to revamp. It was not 
intransigence that led them to eschew long voyages. With the bounty payment 
tied to voyages, innovation  of the American  institutional technology would 
have been costly. The bounty did disappear in the mid-l820s, but given the 
lags inherent in any structural innovation (recruiting and training artisans and 
altering the duties of officers and other crewmen would take time), the industry 
might well have been out of  business before entrepreneurs could exploit the 
American institution. The same circumstances trapped  British whalemen in 
the northern seas, despite the growing scarcity of whales. 
The evidence indicates that, by  American standards, British  whalers after 
1835 were neither productive nor profitable.  Bounties and warships enabled 
the British both to replace the Dutch and, supported by  a series of protective 
tariffs, to fend  off  incipient American  competition.  British dominance  was 
rooted, not in economic superiority, but in government policy. 
Such policies are not immutable. To the extent that they work by distorting 
26. Jackson 1978, 135. The quoted remarks are from the testimony of Joseph Somes, a Londoner 
who owned three whalers engaged in the southern fishery. Whitecar (1864, 122, 123) has very 
critical things to say about British crews and officers in the southern fleet in the 1850s. 481  The Americans Replace the British 
relative prices, they induce substitution  against the protected  commodities. 
Competition springs up everywhere, and is almost impossible to restrain. In a 
technical sense coal oil may have been an inferior substitute for whale oil; in 
an economic sense it was a more than adequate substitute at the tariff-inflated 
domestic price of whale oil. 
Again, policy frequently derives from some noneconomic argument in the 
government’s utility function; the weights assigned to the argument can, and 
do, change with conditions-social,  political, and economic. As long as a Con- 
tinental war was a serious threat, the British government was prepared to pay 
(or let its citizens pay) handsomely for a ready supply of ships and seamen. As 
the threat of war receded, the political revenues of the policy receded as well, 
but the political costs in taxes, forgone alternatives, and consumer discontent 
remained high. The policy became politically unprofitable. 
Finally, the distribution of political influence is not fixed. Whalemen and oil 
merchants were forces to be reckoned with in the eighteenth century; fifty 
years later textile manufacturers and merchants commanded the government’s 
attention. 
As the British industry contracted, the American expanded. Fewer British 
vessels meant less crowding in the North Atlantic, and reduced British tariffs 
meant a larger export market. American entrepreneurs-New  Bedford owners 
and agents in particular-secured  a commanding position in all the whaling 
grounds of the world. 
Appendix 12A 
Computing the Relative Productivities of the British 
Northern and the American (New Bedford) Atlantic 
Whaling Fleets 
Three variants of productivity were calculated: variant S (time at sea), variant 
M (maximum inputs), and variant L (most likely). For the American fleet the 
M and L variants are identical. See the text for a full account of these variants. 
Productivity Formula 
The formula for calculating the productivity of an individual voyage is de- 
scribed in chapter 8. Only American voyages can be analyzed in this way; data 
on individual British voyages are not available. In order to compare the two 
fleets, computations must be made at a fleet level, treating all of a fleet’s voy- 
ages in one year as one grand voyage. The formula for doing so can be broken 
into four parts. 
1. (The share of oil in the value of output of the given fleet [i.e., British or 
American] in the given year, plus the mean of the shares of oil in the value of 482  Chapter 12 
output of both fleets across all years) times (the natural log of the output of oil 
of the given fleet in the given year, minus the mean of the natural logs of the 
outputs of oil in both fleets in all years). 
2. Part 2 is identical to part  1, except that the word bone is substituted for 
oil, wherever oil appears, 
3. (The share of labor income in the value of output of the given fleet in the 
given year, plus the mean of the shares of labor income in the values of output 
of both fleets in all years) times (the natural log of the labor input into produc- 
tion [number of crewmen] in the given fleet in the given year, minus the mean 
of the natural logs of the labor inputs in both fleets in all years). 
4. Part 4 is identical to part 3, except that the word capital is substituted for 
labor, wherever  labor appears. (Capital input into production is represented 
by tonnage.) 
Labor is measured  in  man-months  (the number  of  the  vessel’s crewmen 
times the number of  months of the voyage), capital, in vessel ton-months (the 
number of the vessel’s tons times the number of months). Labor income equals 
the value of lays (American), or wages (British), plus subsistence. The produc- 
tivity of a given fleet in a given year equals 
((Part I  + Part 2)/2) -  ((Part 3 + Part 4)/2). 
The resulting productivity measurements are expressed in natural logs. They 
may also be given in the form of the antilogs, and that is the form underlying 
the  figures in table  12.1. Comparisons  may  properly  be drawn  within each 
fleet, across time, or between fleets. 
Data Sources: United States 
The American data were taken from the Voyages and Crew Counts data sets 
(see chapter 3). In order to enter the calculation, a voyage had to sail for the 
Atlantic Ocean, Hudson Bay, or Davis Strait; sail from and return to New Bed- 
ford; return between  1817 and 1842; and carry home a ratio of sperm oil to 
whale oil of no more than 0.25. In addition we had to know the size of its crew, 
its tonnage, and the length of its voyage. Two hundred and eighty-one voyages 
met these conditions. (Since each voyage was allocated to the year in which 
the vessel returned to New Bedford, the calculation omits voyages that resulted 
in the condemnation, loss, or sale of the vessel before it could return to New 
Bedford. See the text for a further treatment of  this topic.) 
Shares of Labor and  Capital Income in the Value of  Output. The amount of 
income flowing to labor was computed for each voyage as the sum of the value 
of the crew’s lay shares and the cost of their subsistence. The value of lays was 
taken to be 31 percent of the value of the catch (see the text, table 5.15, and 
appendix 9A). The cost of subsistence depends on the size of the crew. In 1844 
it cost $35 a year to feed one whaling crewman (see appendix 5C). The algo- 483  The Americans Replace the British 
rithm for subsistence is thus $35 times the food price index2’  times the number 
of men in the crew times the length of the voyage in years. 
Lay value and subsistence amount were summed at the voyage level. These 
total labor income amounts, and the per-voyage value of catch amounts, were 
then summed by amval year. The ratio between them is labor’s share of output, 
and the remainder is capital’s share (see table 12A.1). 
Data Sources: Britain 
Oil  Outputs. Tuns of  oil were taken from Gordon Jackson (1978, 270).28  See 
table  12A.2. A tun was an old British measure approximately equal to 252 
British gallons (169 n. 18). The British gallon was equal to 1.20095  American 
gallons. The American barrel-the  unit in which our American oil figures were 
generally reported-was  equal to 31.5 American gallons. In order to convert 
British tuns to American gallons, then, we multiplied Jackson’s oil catch figures 
by (252 X  1.20095)/31.5, or 9.608. 
Oil Prices. British oil prices (per tun) were taken from J. R. McCulloch 1842, 
162; 1854, 1404. Between his two volumes McCulloch gives a complete series 
of  prices for the southern fishery for the years  1817-42.  His prices for the 
northern fishery, present only in the 1854 edition, are not a complete series. 
Where the southern and northern prices are both present, they are almost al- 
ways identical (and we see no reason why they should in fact have differed). 
In those few cases where the southern and northern prices differ in McCulloch, 
we have used the price that seems more reasonable: for 1825-26 the southern 
price, for 1840-42  the northern price. 
Bone  Outputs. Tons of  bone for  1817-34  and  1837-41  come from Gordon 
Jackson 1978, 270. Tons of  bone for 1835 and  1836 were estimated on the 
basis of the output of oil in these years and the ratio (.0533) of tons of bone to 
tuns of oil, 1831-34  and 1837-39,  for the British fleet. The output of bone for 
1842 was estimated in the same way  as the outputs for 1835-36,  except that 
the estimating ratio (.0340) was computed on the basis of bone output to oil 
output in 1840 and 184  1. 
American bone output was reported in pounds. In the nineteenth century the 
British used the short ton of  two thousand pounds (McCulloch 1842, 1165). 
We  multiplied British bone figures by two thousand to make them equivalent 
to American figures. 
27. Warren and Pearson “Foods” wholesale price index (US.  Department of  Commerce 1975, 
28. Jackson gives as his source McCulloch  1854, 1542, and notes one change he  made to 
series E-54). divided by seventy-two (the 1844 value), so that 1844 = 1.0. 
McCulloch’s figures. Table 12A.1  Shares of Labor Income and Capital Income in the Value of Output, 
American (New Bedford)  Atlantic Fleet, 181742 
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Sources: For a description of the data sources and computation, see the text. 
Table 12A.2  Data on the British Northern Whaling Fleet, 1817-42 
Oil  Oil Price  Oil Value  Bone  Bone Price  Bone Value  Tonnage  Tonnage  Crewmen 
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Sources: For a description of the data sources and computation, see the text 485  The Americans Replace the British 
Bone Prices. Bone prices for 1817-21  and 1822-24  are available in Jackson 
(1978, 1  18).29  We  divided the 1824 British price by  the 1824 American price, 
and multiplied each succeeding American price by this ratio in order to extrap- 
olate missing British prices. 
Tonnages Setting Out. Knowing the size of the fleet that set out in each year is 
necessary to compute the size of the fleet that returned. The tonnages of vessels 
setting out in the northern fleet in 1817-34  were taken from Jackson 1978,270, 
in  1841-42  from British Parliamentary Papers (House of  Commons  1845). 
Tonnages for 1835-40,  missing in these sources, were estimated by a regres- 
sion on numbers of vessels and total tonnages for the years 1816-34 and 1841- 
42. The data on numbers of vessels were taken from Jackson 1978, 270. (The 
number of vessels sailing in a year is the sum of the number sailing for Green- 
land and the number sailing for Davis Strait.) The estimation equation is 
Tons = -360.86  + 359.64 VG + 276.78 VD -  1.594 YRVG + 1.715 YRVD 
(-1.0)  (+32.5)  (+20.8)  (-2.5)  (+3.4) 
where VG is the number of vessels sailing for Greenland, VD is the number of 
vessels sailing for Davis Strait, YRVG is YEAR X  VG, and YRVD is YEAR X 
VD. (YEAR is the year in question minus  1800.) The figures in parentheses 
above are t values. The adjusted R2  is .9993 and the F value is 7,561.9. 
Tonnages Returning.  Productivity is  figured only  for  vessels  that  returned 
safely to port. The number of vessels sailing and the number lost in each year 
1817-42  are given in Jackson 1978, 270. Dividing the initial tonnage by  the 
number of vessels sailing gives tons per vessel. Subtracting the number of ves- 
sels lost from the number sailing gives the number returning. Multiplying the 
tons per vessel by  the number returning gives the tonnage returning. (We as- 
sumed that, on average, a vessel lost had the same tonnage as a vessel setting out.) 
Crewmen Returning. Jackson (1978, 129) reprints from British Parliamentary 
Papers total tonnage and crew figures for the years 1830-32  and  1841-42.30 
McCulloch (1842, 1241) prints total tonnage and crew figures for the years 
1817-24.  We  calculated crewmen per ton using Jackson and McCulloch, and 
estimated ratios for 1825-29  and 1833-40 by interpolation. (There is no clear 
trend in the ratios for 1817-24  and 1830-32; therefore, we used as the interpo- 
lator for the years 1825-29  the mean ratio for 1822-24 and 1830-3 1. There is 
a clear trend thereafter. We estimated the ratios for 1833-39 on the assumption 
that the ratio rose at a steady pace between 1832 and 1840.) Multiplying crew- 
men per ton by  returning tonnage gives returning crewmen. 
29. Jackson used local prices at Hull. 
30. These tonnage figures don’t precisely match those Jackson prints on page 270. 486  Chapter 12 
Shares of  Labor and Capital Income in the Value of  Output. The share of in- 
come flowing to labor was 34.1 percent in 1817-25,28.2  percent in 1826-35, 
and 61.8 percent in 1836-42.  (See appendix 12B for a description of the data 
sources and computations. These shares can be computed from table  12B.3, 
lines 3, 7, and 8, as [line 3 + line 8]/line 7.) The share flowing to capital in 
each period was the remainder, or 65.9, 71.8, and 38.2 percent. 
Appendix 12B 
Computing Profit Rates for the British Northern and 
the American (New  Bedford)  Atlantic Whaling Fleets 
Table 12B.1  Computation of Average Profit Rates, American (New Bedford) 
Atlantic Fleet, Returning Years 181742 
A. Computation of Average Values per Ton as of  Sailing Dates, 
1880 Prices ($) 
Total Investment 
Huli"  Outfitb  Subsistence'  (hull + outfit + subsistence) 
1817-25  40.66  18.89  3.74 
1826-35  45.10  18.20  3.84 




B. Computation of  Average Values per Ton of Hulls on the Return to 
New Bedford ($) 
Net Value of  Hull 
Hull*  Depreciationd  (hull -  depreciation) 
18  17-25  40.66  1.41  39.25 
1826-35  45.10  1.56  43.54 
1836-42  44.73  2.24  42.49 
C. Computation of Average Net Revenues per Ton ($) 
Interest 
Gross Revenue'  Lays'  Vessels Lost'  Forgoneh  Net Revenue' 
-  ~ 
18  17-25  59.28  18.38  0.88  3.71  36.3 1 
1826-35  63.49  19.68  2.08  3.87  37.86 
1836-42  77.38  23.99  3.14  6.63  43.62 Table 12.B1  (continued) 
D. Computation of  Average Profit Rates ($) 
Total Net Return  Original  Profit 
Net Value of Hull  (net hull +  Investment  Ratel 
on Return  Net Revenue  revenue)  (from panel A)  (%) 
18  17-25  39.25  36.31  75.56  63.29  16.17 
1826-35  43.54  37.86  81.40  67.14  17.59 
1836-42  42.49  43.62  86.11  75.65  7.86 
Note: All monetary values are in 1880 prices. The deflator is the Warren and Pearson “All Com- 
modities” wholesale price index (U.S. Department of Commerce 1975, series E-52). Values were 
adjusted to the 1880 level by dividing them by these index numbers (divided by one hundred). 
’The value of a vessel at the beginning of the voyage was computed by multiplying its TONNAGE 
by  BCOSTCN for SAILYR. These values and tonnages were summed up for 75 voyages arriving 
in the years 1817-25,  161 voyages amving in 1826-35,  and 74 voyages arriving in 1836-42. The 
sum of values was divided by  the sum of tonnages. (For BCOSTCN-building  cost per ton ac- 
cording to the Commissioner of Navigation, in  1880 prices-see  chapter 6 and table 6.10.) Both 
the British and the American vessels were valued at new prices for purposes of  these calculations, 
since we have no information on the market values of these vessels. 
bThe outfitting cost for each voyage was computed from the OPTM1880 value for the year in 
which the voyage began, times the vessel’s TONNAGE, times the INTERVAL of the voyage. (IN- 
TERVAL is the length of the voyage in calendar months.) These costs were summed up within 
each period and the sum divided by the corresponding sum of  vessel tonnages. 
OPTMl880 represents complete outfitting costs for the whole voyage, exclusive of  costs of 
provisioning and costs of  outfitting the men. The outfitting cost per ton month, in prices of  1880, 
was computed as follows: 
1. The costs of outfitting the Calla0 in  1871 and provisioning the bark during the voyage she 
began in that year were computed from data reported in Moment 1957. (This is an exceptionally 
clear and detailed accounting of outfitting costs.) Moment (271) reports total debits for outfitting 
the vessel of  $33,472. He (272) reports that the captain spent $1,900 on provisions during the 
voyage. $33,472 + $1,900 = $35,372. 
2. The value of subsistence and the value of advances were subtracted. We figured subsistence 
as $35 per year per crew member, in 1844  prices (see appendix 5C), times 33 crew members times 
50/12 (the voyage lasted  fifty months).  In order to convert to  1871 prices,  we  multiplied by 
1,80556-the  ratio of the Warren and Pearson “Foods” index number for 1871 (130) to the index 
number for 1844 (72)-yielding  $8,689. Of  the amount that Moment reports as outfitting costs, 
$3,788 was charged to the crew (i.e., advances). $35,372 -  $8,689 -  $3,788 = $22,895. 
3. This figure was divided by  the tonnage of  the Callao times the INTERVAL of  her  1871 
voyage. $22,895/(323.7 tons X 50 months = 16,185) = $1.41458, or $1.415. 
4. This figure, in turn, was carried to other years on the Warren and Pearson “Textile Products” 
wholesale price index (US.  Department of Commerce 1975, series E-56). (The idea is that outfit- 
ting costs fluctuated, roughly, with textiles [sails] prices.) 
5. These numbers were then deflated using the Warren and Pearson “All Commodities” whole- 
sale price index. 
‘Subsistence was calculated by multiplying the number of men in the vessel’s crew for the voyage 
by  $35 (subsistence per man-year in 1844 prices; see appendix 5C). the result multiplied by the 
ratio of the Warren and Pearson “Foods” wholesale price index number for the year in which the 
voyage began to the index number for  1844, the result multiplied by  INTERVAL/12, the result 
divided by  the Warren and Pearson “All Commodities” index for the beginning year (divided by 
one hundred). The resulting subsistence amounts and the tonnages of the vessels were summed up 
for 67 voyages arriving in the years 1817-25,  143 voyages arriving in 1826-35,  and 71 voyages 
arriving in  1836-42.  (Fewer voyages enter this calculation than entered the calculation of hull 
(continued) Table 12.B1  (continued) 
values because here it is necessary to know also the size of the crew.) The sum of subsistences 
was divided by the sum of voyage tonnages. 
dAssuming a life of thirty-four years (the average actual life of those vessels that lived to be con- 
demned), depreciation is ,02924 per year. The period over which depreciation was taken was the 
period at sea plus the period of outfitting. See table 12B.2. 
‘The  value of the catch of each voyage was computed by  multiplying the amount of sperm oil 
returned by the price of sperm oil in the year the voyage ended, multiplying the amount of whale 
oil by the price of whale oil, multiplying the amount of bone by the price of bone, adding up these 
three elements of value, and dividing the sum by the Warren and Pearson ‘All Commodities” index 
(divided by one hundred). These per-voyage value-of-catch amounts were summed up within each 
period and the sum divided by  the corresponding sum of voyage tonnages. For catch prices see 
appendix 9A. 
The lay share was computed as 31 percent of the value of  the catch (see chapter 5 and note e). 
Per-voyage lay shares were summed within each period and the sum divided by the corresponding 
sum of voyage tonnages. 
gThe total value of vessels lost within each period was divided among vessels returning to New 
Bedford, and expressed as a value per ton of vessels that returned safely to port. For example, five 
vessels that had set out from New Bedford for the Atlantic or Hudson Bay were lost in 1826-35. 
Assuming that they were equal in value per ton to the 161 vessels that returned to New Bedford 
from those hunting grounds in those years, the value of the lost vessels would be 5/161 of the 
value of the vessels that returned. If this value is distributed among returning vessels, the cost per 
ton of returning vessels is $2.08. One can think of these costs as insurance premiums. 
Total Investment  Cost per Ton 
Lost  Returned  Fraction  ($1  ($) 
1817-25  1  75  ,013  63.29  0.82 
1826-35  5  161  .03  1  67.14  2.08 
1836-42  3  74  .04  1  75.65  3.10 
The loss rate is overstated. The actual numbers of voyages that had set out for the Atlantic or 
Hudson Bay and returned safely to New Bedford during each period were 1817-25,  I1  1 ;  1826-35, 
236; 1835-42,  165. The number on which our rates were based are those that can be used in the 
computation of profit rates (i.e., we must know the  length of the voyage and the amount of the 
catch to compute the profit rate) and that are comparable to the voyages of the British fleet (i.e., 
we have omitted voyages for which sperm oil accounted for 25 percent or more of the catch of oil). 
Because American loss rates are overstated, American profit rates are understated. Total investment 
figures are from table 12B.1, panel A. 
hThe interest rates we used are New England municipal bond yields, taken from Homer and Sylla 
1991, 286-87:  1817-25  = 4.94 percent, 1826-35  = 4.84 percent, and 1836-42  = 5.02 percent. 
The period over which interest was forgone was the period of outfitting plus the period at sea. 




[(1.0494)11825  -  I] X $63.29 = .0586754 X $63.29 = $3.71; 
[(1.0484)’1867  -  I] X $67.14 = .0576924 X $67.14 = $3.87; 
[(1.0502)17’40  -  11  X $75.65 = ,0875775 X $75.65 = $6.63. 
‘Net revenue is gross revenue minus lays, vessels lost, and interest forgone. 
The  profit rate was computed as x =  y( 1 + r)n,  where x = total net return, y = original investment, 
r = profit rate, and n = fraction of a year (see table 12B.2).  This form of the computation is correct 
since most of the returns-virtually  all, for the Atlantic-were  realized at the end of the voyage. Table 12B.2  Depreciation Calculation for Hulls, New Bedford Whaling Voyages to 
the Atlantic and Hudson Bay, 181742 
Fraction  Depreciation 
Interval"  Outfittingb  Total Months  of a Year  per Ton' 
18  17-25  11.69  2.5  14.19  1.1825  1.41 
1826-35  11.76  2.5  14.26  1.1867  1.56 
1836-42  18.07  2.5  20.57  1.7140  2.24 
"Mean  values of  INTERVAL (length of  voyage in months) of the Atlantic voyages ending in these 
three periods. 
bSee table 6.7 and chapter 12, note 36. 
'.02924  X fraction of a year X hull (from table 12B.1). 
Table 12B.3  Computation of Average Profit Rates, British Northern Fleet, 
Returning Years 181742 
A. True Profits ($), Variant A" 
18  17-25  182635  1836-42 
1. Value of  hull at sailing 
2. Value of outfits' 
3. Cost of subsistenced 
4. Total investment (1 + 2 + 3) 
5.  Depreciation' 
6. Net value of hull on return to port 
7. Gross revenue' 
8. Labor incomeg 
9. Value of  vessels losth 
10. Interest forgone' 
11. Net revenue (7 -  8 -  9 -  10) 
12. Total net return (6 + 11) 
13. Profit rate (%p 
(1 -  5) 
14. Value of hull at sailing (US.)] 
15. Value of outfits" 
16. Total investment (14 + 15 + 3) 
17. Depreciation' 
18. Net value of hull on return to port 
(14 - 17) 
19. Value of vessels losth 
20. Interest forgone' 
21. Net revenue (7 -  8 -  19 -  20) 
22. Total net return ( 18 + 2 1) 
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-  15.0 Table 12B.3  (continued) 
C. Counterfactual Profits ($), Variant A" 
18  17-25  1826-35  1836-42 
24. Gross revenueo  32.80  38.19  13.67 
25. Net revenue (24 -  8 -  9 -  10)  15.16*  12.28  -0.79 
26. Total net return (6 + 25)  94.95  100.63  86.97 
27. Profit rate (%)I  -9.6  -14.0  -27.3 
D. Counterfactual Profits ($), Variant Bq 
28. Net revenue (24 -  8 -  19 -  20) 
29. Total net return (18 + 28) 
30. Profit rate (%Oy 
16.76  14.55  0.48 
76.61  80.82  66.30 
-0.3  -6.6  -26.6 
31. Value of hull at sailing (U.S.) 
32. Total investment (3 + 15 + 31) 
33. Depreciation' 
34. Net value of hull on return to port 
35. Value of vessels losth 
36. Interest forgone' 
37. Net revenue (24 -  8 -  35 -  36) 
38. Total net return (34 + 37) 
39. Profit rate (%)I 
(31 -  33) 




























Nore: All monetary values are per vessel ton, expressed in U.S.  dollars of  1880 
"Variant A estimates rest on upper-bound estimates of the cost of British vessels and outfits 
bAverage U.S. hull values per ton (table  12B.1) times 2.0. The estimate is intended as an upper 
bound, or close thereto. It is based on relative construction costs reported by Hutchins 1941, 202. 
'British outfitting costs per ton were estimated on the basis of the U.S. estimates (see table 12B.1), 
on the assumptions that (1) they exceeded American costs, ceteris paribus, in the same proportion 
as British vessel construction costs per ton exceeded American vessel construction costs; and (2) 
they fell short of American costs, ceteris paribus, in the same proportion as British voyage lengths 
fell short of American voyage lengths. Thus 
BOCPT = USOCPT X BHCPTIUSHCPT X BVLIUSVL, 
where BOCPT is British outfitting costs per ton, USOCPT is U.S.  outfitting costs per ton, BHCPT 
is British hull costs per ton, USHCPTis U.S. hull costs per ton, BVL is British voyage length, and 
USVL is U.S. voyage length. Thus 
1817-25: BOCPT=  18.89 X 2.00 X 5.2/11.69 = 16.81; 
1826-35: BOUT= 18.20 X 2.00 X 5.9/11.76 = 18.26; 
1836-42:  BOCPT = 24.36 X 2.00 X 5.3/18.07 = 14.29. 
The values for BVL are derived from Jackson 1978. We  infer that Greenland voyages took about 
four and one-half months, and Davis Strait voyages about six months (78-81).  Page 270 contains 
data on the number of voyages made to the two hunting grounds each year. 
dThese  estimates are based on the assumption that British subsistence costs per man-year were the 
same as American costs. (See table 12B.1, note c.) In order to calculate British subsistence rates 
for this table, it was necessary to estimate the average tonnage and number of crewmen of the 
British northern fleet in each of the three periods represented, as well as the fraction of the year 
that British vessels were typically at sea. For the American calculation we used the Voyages and Table 12B.3  (continued) 
Crew Counts data sets. For the calculations of British tonnages and crews see appendix 12A. For 
the fraction of the year British vessels typically spent at sea, see note c. 
‘We  assumed that British vessels had the same depreciation rate as American vessels--.02924  per 
year (see table 12B.2)-and  here again figured depreciation on the period at sea plus the period 
of outfitting. (See table  128.4.) To  the extent that British whalers were unemployed when not 
whaling, these figures understate British depreciation. Depreciation for lines  17 and 33 use the 
same rate but different hull costs. 
‘Total revenues received by  British shipowners, including earnings from the subsidy as well as 
tariff-inflated prices for whale oil and bone. See Davis, Gallman, and Hutchins 1987b, 753, table 
2, panel C, “G.B.Rl.” 
Appendix 12A describes the computation of British output volumes and values. Subsidies are 
available in McCulloch 1842, 1241. The pound-to-dollar exchange rate we used is derived from 
McCulloch 1842, 942. The conversion to constant dollars employed the Warren and Pearson “All 
Commodities” wholesale price index (US.  Department of Commerce 1975, series E-52)-on  the 
base 1880. 
See  appendix 12C. 
hThe value of vessels lost is total investment times the fraction of  the fleet lost. The fraction of 
the fleet lost was calculated from data in Jackson 1978, 270. Loss rates are the same in variants 
A and B. 
“‘Interest forgone” is the opportunity cost of the investments recorded in line 4. The interest rates 
were taken from Homer and Sylla 1991, 195-96,  and are the annual yields on 3 percent consols: 
1817-25  = 3.61 percent, 1826-35  = 3.51 percent, and 1836-42  = 3.31 percent. The period over 
which interest was forgone was the period of outfitting plus the period at sea. (See table 12B.5.) 




[(1.0361)Mih67  - 11 X $101.29 = $2.33; 
[(1.0351)’ -  I] X $111.88 = $2.74; 
[(1.0331)65 - I] X $106.97 = $2.29. 
Since the amount of investment per ton drops from variant A to B to C, so does the interest forgone. 
’The profit  rate was computed using x = y(  I  + r)”, where  x  = total net return, y  = original 
investment, r = profit rate, and n = fraction of  a year (see table 12B.4). This form of the computa- 
tion is correct since most of the returns-virtually  all, for the Atlantic-were  realized at the end 
of the voyage. 
kVariant  B estimates rest on lower-bound estimates of the cost of British vessels and outfits. 
IAverage U.S. hull value per ton (table 12B.1) times 1.5. The estimate is intended as a lower bound. 
See note b. 
“‘See note c. The formulas in this case are 
1817-25:  BOCPT=  18.89 X  1.5 X 5.2/11.69 = 12.60; 
1826-35:  BOCPT = 18.20 X  1.5 X 5.9/11.76 = 13.70; 
1836-42:  EOCPT = 24.36 X  1.5 X 5.3/18.07 = 10.72. 
BOCPTis British outfitting costs per ton. 
“These  estimates rest on high (lines 1 and 2) vessel costs. 
“Revenue figures exclude bounties and price inflation due to tariffs. 
PExcluding bounties from labor payments. 
‘These estimates rest on low (lines 14 and 15) vessel costs. Revenue figures exclude bounties and 
price inflation due to tariffs. 
‘These estimates rest on U.S. hull costs and low (variant B) outfitting costs. Revenue figures ex- 
clude bounties and price inflation due to tariffs. 492  Chapter 12 
Table 12B.4  Depreciation Calculation for British Vessels 
Fraction  Depreciation 
Interval"  Outfittingb  Total Months  of a Year  per Ton' 
18  17-25  5.2  2.5  7.7  ,6417  1.53 
1826-35  5.9  2.5  8.4  ,7000  1.85 
1836-42  5.3  2.5  7.8  ,6500  1.70 
"See table 12B.3, note c. 
bThe period to refit was assumed to be the same for the British as for the Americans. 
'.02924 X fraction of a year X hull (from table 12B.3). 
Appendix 12C 
Computing Labor Income for the British Northern 
Whaling Fleet 
Crewmen on British whalers in the early nineteenth century received five types 
of payment: bounties (through 1824); bonuses for striking whales (paid to har- 
pooners only), for killing  whales, and for returning oil; and wages (Jenkins 
1921, 189; see also Chatterton 1926, 53). Jenkins provides data on all of these 
types of payment, as of  the late eighteenth century. We used his data to com- 
pute labor costs in British prices of the late eighteenth century, and converted 
them first to British prices of the nineteenth century and then to U.S. dollars 
of  1880. In questions of  doubt we chose always the estimating decision that 
minimized labor costs and thus maximized profits and profit rates. 
Estimates in Eighteenth-Century Prices 
Since bounties, bonuses, and wage rates differed among ranks, we had to 
establish a typical crew roster before we could compute average per-voyage 
labor payments. The roster was derived from Jenkins and Chatterton, and con- 
sists of a captain, four mates, a specksioneer, six harpooners, a carpenter and 
his mate, two head-a-boats (called boatsteerers by Jenkins), six line managers, 
a surgeon, a cook, and twenty-four seamen. A crew of forty-four and an aver- 
age vessel  tonnage of  320 gives a ratio of tons  per crewman  (7.22) that is 
consistent with the data in table 12A.2.?' 
All payments were expressed in pence, for ease of computation. Table 12C.  1 
shows the detailed payment estimates. These rates were used to compute total 
labor costs per year. 
3 I.  Jackson 1978, 270. The mean vessel size for I8 15-34,  the only years for which Jackson has 
data, comes to just under 320 tons. 493  The Americans Replace the British 
Table 12C.1  Labor Payment Rates, British Northern Whaling Fleet, 1769-85 
(pence) 
Bonuses 
Bounties  Per Whale  Per  Per Ton of  Wages 
Crew Roster  per Voyage  Taken  Strike  Oil Returned  per Month 
Captain  5,292  756  -  72  - 
-  840 
480 
-  480 
-  480 
First mate  -  126  - 
Second mate  -  -  -  126 
Third mate  -  126  - 
Fourth mate  -  126  - 
Specksioneer  2,268  126  -  72  - 
Harpooners  12,096  -  126  378  - 
Carpenter's mate  -  -  - 




-  2,520 
840 
360 
-  8,782 
Total  19,656  2,814  756"  522  17,182 
-  -  Carpenter  -  126 
60 
Head-a-boats  -  120 
Surgeon  -  252 
30  Cook 
Seamen  -  660  - 
-  - 
-  - 
-  -  - 
Source: See text. 
"We assumed there were six  strikes for each whale taken (including strikes on whales that es- 
caped). 
Bounties. If  the typical vessel was 320 tons, bounties per vessel ton  came to 
19,656d320 = 61.4d. We  multiplied tonnage returning in each year (table 
12A.2) by  this coefficient to obtain total bounty payments per year (see table 
12C.2). (Bounties were suspended after 1824.) 
Whale Bonuses. The number of  whales taken each year (Jackson 1978, 270) 
was multiplied by the bonus rate (2,814 + 756 = 3,570, table 12C.1) to yield 
the annual total whale bonus payments (table 12C.2). 
Oil Bonus. The bonus per ton of oil was 522d (table 12C.1). Our annual output 
data are expressed in tuns, not tons. Since tuns ran  about  1,890 pounds, or 
0.945 of a ton (2,000 pounds), the rate per tun would have been 522 X 0.945 = 
493d (Jackson 1978, 169). (Jenkins's ton may  actually be  a tun. If  so, our 
method of estimating understates costs and overstates profits.) 
Wages. Table  12C.1 gives wages per vessel per month of  17,182d. Per voyage, 
then, wages were 
1817-1825  = 17,182d X 5.2 = 89,3464 
1826-1835  = 17,182d X 5.9 = 101,374d, Table 12C.2  British Labor Costs per Vessel Ton per Voyage 
A. Annual Figures 
Late-Eighteenth-Century Pence 
Total Labor 
Tonnage  Total  Total  Total  Total  Total  Total Labor Costs,  costs,  Total Labor 

































































































































































































7 10.4 1  3 
203,116 
3 18.97 1 
329,324 
7,593,696 













































Labor Costs per 
Tonnage  Ton per Voyage 
Returning  Labor Costs  (1880 $1 
1817-25  378,571  4,601,53  1 
1826-35  258,111  4,280,430 




Source: See text. 496  Chapter 12 
Table 12C.3  U.S. Price Index Numbers, Whale Oil (New Bedford) and All 
Commodities, 1817-42 
Warren and Pearson 
Whale Oil  “All Commodities” 















































































Source: See text. 
and 
1836-1842 = 17,182d X 5.3 = 91,065d. 
Dividing by 320 (the assumed average vessel size) yields wages per vessel ton 
per voyage of 1817-25,279.2d;  1826-35,316.8d; and 1836-42,284.6d. Vessel 
tonnage returning each  year  (table  12A.2) was  multiplied  by  the  relevant 
wages-per-ton coefficient to yield total wage payments. 
Estimates in Nineteenth-Century Prices 
The total cost estimates in column 6 of  table  12C.2 are based on late- 
eighteenth-century payment rates. We  had to convert these figures into rates 
relevant to the period 1817-42, then to convert these values from sterling into 
dollars, and finally to deflate by  the price index we have used throughout to 
denominate all values in U.S. dollars of  1880 (U.S. Department of Commerce 
1975, series E-52). 497  The Americans Replace the British 
Payment rates presumably changed in the long run more or less as the price 
of output changed. We  therefore made up (table 12C.3) an index of whale oil 
prices on  the  base  1769-85  from data  in  table  12A.2 and Jackson  (1978, 
268). This index was used to convert our eighteenth-century estimates into 
nineteenth-century values. It should be said that annual wage-rate fluctuations 
are quite unlikely to mimic short-term movements in oil prices. Therefore, the 
annual data should not be understood to be true annual labor cost estimates. 
Wage rates and oil prices, however, are more likely to move in concert in the 
long run. Therefore, the average values for the years 1817-25,  1826-35,  and 
1836-42  are probably reasonable estimates of  average labor costs. We  used 
only these averages in our calculation of labor costs, profits, and profit rates. 
In converting to dollars we used the exchange rate of $4.7059 to the pound, 
taken from McCulloch 1854,942. There were 240 pence in a pound and there- 
fore 51 pence in a dollar. Once costs were expressed in current dollars, we 
converted them to constant dollars on the basis of the Warren and Pearson “All 
Commodities” wholesale price index (U.S. Department of  Commerce 1975, 
series E-52). 